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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to propose the use of a cloud-based integrity management service coupled with a
trustworthy client component – in the form of the Trust Extension Device (TED) platform – as a means to to increase the
quality of the security evaluation of a client. Thus, in addition to performing authentication of the client (e.g. as part of
Single Sign-On), the Identity Provider asks that the integrity of the client platform be computed and then be
evaluated by a trustworthy and independent Cloud-based Integrity Measurement Service (cIMS). The TED platform has
been previously developed based on the Trusted Platform Module (TPM), and allows the integrity measurement of
the client environment to be conducted and reported in a secure manner. Within the SSO ﬂow, the portable TED
device performs an integrity measurement of the client platform, and sends an integrity report to the cIMS as part of
the client authentication process. The cIMS validates the measurements performed by the TED device, and reports a
trust score to the Identity Provider (IdP). The IdP takes into account the reported trust score when the IdP computes
and issues a Level of Assurance (LOA) value to the client platform. In this way the Service Provider obtains a greater
degree of assurance that the client’s computing environment is relatively free of unrecognized and/or unauthorized
components.
Introduction
Today there is a strong interest within Enterprises to move
some or all their IT infrastructure and services to the
cloud, with the aim among others of reducing the cost of
IT operations as a whole. However, there are a number
of security and privacy issues relating to cloud-based ser-
vices, including the issues relating to providing access to
external entities.
Two of the common cloud deployment scenarios faced
by many Enterprises today are as follows:
• Employee access to cloud-based applications: An
Enterprise seeks to make cloud-based
productivity-applications available to its employees.
The employees should not notice any diﬀerences
between accessing the application in the cloud versus
the same application running on a local machine.
This scenario has a number of security implications.
One implication is the need for the employee
authentication status and authorization data to be
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conveyed from the Enterprise to Cloud-based
provider. In this scenario the Enterprise remains
being the authoritative source of all employee
identity. Typically employee identities and privileges
are managed through the corporate directory service,
which itself may or may not be in the cloud (though
this is tangential to the case of the cloud-based
applications scenario).
• Enterprise with in-bound institutional customers:
Another scenario is one in which an Enterprise with
its applications running in the cloud is sharing this
application with another organization. Thus,
consider an Enterprise-A that has as its customer
another institution called Enterprise-B with its own
employees. For example, Enterprise-A could be
ﬁnancial services company oﬀering retirement fund
(e.g. U.S. 401K) management for employees of
Enterprise-B. Here Enterprise-A has customer-facing
applications that are operating in the Cloud (e.g. SaaS
application). A key aspect of this scenario is that
Enterprise-B is the authoritative source of identity for
its employees, all of whom are accessing the
cloud-based application belonging to Enterprise-A.
Thus, authentication and authorization data must be
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conveyed from Enterprise-B into the cloud-based
application within the domain or realm of
Enterprise-A.
An additional aspect of these scenarios is that Enter-
prises have already invested in and deployed strong
authentication infrastructure and identity management
services. Many seek to extend and re-use these infrastruc-
tures to address the needs of the new cloud environment.
Parallel to the recent developments in cloud-based ser-
vices is that of the development of loosely connected
federated identity and authentication services in the low-
value consumer space. These low-value federated identity
services have been exempliﬁed by social networks where
one simple password-based login to one social network
allows the user to access other social networks with-
out needing to perform further authentications. Although
Enterprises have been interested in using this model to
expand their customer base, one stumbling block remains
that of the low security-quality of these loosely connected
federated identity services.
Partly in response to this poor security quality, several
organizations have emerged with the aim of deﬁning the
so-called standard trust frameworks as a means to boot-
strap trust among entities in the identity ecosystem [1,2].
These trust frameworks provide a foundation for entities
to transact based on an agreed common legal contract,
thereby overcoming the limitations and non-scalability
of bilateral agreements. One common aspect of many of
these trust frameworks is the use of a Level of Assurance
(LOA) as a means to denote the quality of authentication
performed by (and therefore conﬁdence in) an identity
provider. The LOA is a way to express the quality of
the authentication event from the perspective of security.
Thus, for example, a user wielding a hardware token in a
two-factor authentication event will obtain a higher LOA
value compared to a user that authenticates merely using
a password. The US National Institute for Standards and
Technology (NIST) has issued a publication deﬁning a
granular level of LOA values [3].
In this paper we argue that in addition to strong authen-
tication with high LOA values, identity-based services in
the cloud need to also perform access decisions based
on the quality of the computing platforms or devices
from which clients (e.g. employees, customers, or users)
perform remote access to these cloud-based applications
and services. We believe that a measured trustworthiness
indicator or the so-called trust score of a given comput-
ing platform should be part of the authentication and
authorization of that platform when it seeks access to
services in the cloud. In so far as possible, the comput-
ing platform elements being measured include all soft-
wares and ﬁrmwares, and also the hardware component
identiﬁers [4].
We also argue that in order for new cloud-based services
to be acceptable by Enterprises today, a high degree of
interoperability with existing “Enterprise-grade” authenti-
cation and authorization infrastructures is required.
In this paper we propose an architecture for a cloud-
based Integrity Measurement Service (cIMS). The cIMS
performs the evaluation of the integrity measurements
received about the client, and issues a trust score reﬂect-
ing its evaluation against one or more predetermined pro-
ﬁles for clientmeasurements.We use the classic SAML 2.0
ecosystem [5] as a means to illustrate usage of the cIMS.
In this model, a client seeking access to a Service Provider
(SP) must ﬁrst be authenticated by an Identity Provider
(IdP), who issues SAML assertions pertaining to the client.
Here we extend the SAML2.0 model by having the IdP
request also from the client an integrity measurement
report. In order to satisfy the need for a high LOA level,
we propose the use of a trustworthy portable comput-
ing platform, the Trust Extension Device (TED) to provide
the client-side trusted computing environment capable
of performing integrity measurements of the client-side
components.
Since the NIST Recommendations [3] already point to
the need of hardware tokens to achieve a Level of Assur-
ance (LOA) Level-3 or higher, we believe that the TED
device oﬀers a ﬂexible and portable computing environ-
ment that satisﬁes the NIST Requirements. We believe
the TED device represents a strong token for the sub-
scribers within the e-Authenticationmodel deﬁned within
the NIST Recommendation.
Background: TED and integrity measurements
There has been a growing interest by commercial organi-
sations in providing portable, trusted and secure comput-
ing platforms that may be used in the scenarios such as
those outlined in the Introduction section. A number of
solutions have been proposed from a variety of vendors,
ranging from IronKey [6], and Gemalto [7], to the Singa-
pore Government’s DIVA [8]. Some of these solutions are
strongly tamper resistant and locally tamper evident.
The Trust Extension Device (TED) was developed with
similar goals of providing a portable, secure and trusted
computing platform. However, its key diﬀerentiator is
that it adopted and implemented the Trusted Comput-
ing Group’s (TCG) [9] standards and architectures into
a small, portable device. In particular, the TED provides
an issuing enterprise a truly trusted computing platform
whose root of trust and associated functionality is based
on the Trusted Platform Module (TPM v1.2b [10]) cryp-
tographic microcontroller hardware. The TPM becomes a
root of trust for the TED platform, and allows the remote
validation of its hardware and software through the use
of cryptographically secure integrity measurement and
attestation protocols.
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In the TCG architecture, a specialised Privacy Certify-
ing Authority service is required to participate and pro-
vide supporting validation of credentials and keys that are
used by the TPM to encrypt and sign messages (including
integrity measurements) between the TED and the ser-
vice provider’s cloud infrastructure. Together, the TED,
Privacy Certifying Authority and the service provider’s
cloud infrastructure, develop and maintain a provable,
measurable trust relationship between themselves.
It should be noted here that there are two signiﬁcant
points need to be addressed when implementing and
ultimately deploying such a system.
First, in every TPM enabled enterprise system, the
enterprise application servers need to have complete
knowledge of the hardware and software characteristics of
all their client computers in order to engage, and success-
fully complete, the integritymeasurements and attestation
protocol. Each variation from a standard, known envi-
ronment needs to be identiﬁed, captured and maintained
within the application server so that the attestation pro-
tocols can continue to operate correctly. However, the
variety of software images and hardware conﬁgurations,
the rate at which these change, coupled with the typically
large number of computers connecting to the enterprise
server makes the task of maintaining and managing this
information diﬃcult and challenging.
The TED and associated infrastructure addresses the
management issue by (i) reducing the complexity of the
device and associated operating system and application
software, (ii) having the device issued by a controlling
enterprise/authority and (iii) being suﬃciently cheap and
portable for a new one to be easily re-issued if required.
The TED’s environment (drivers, operating system and
applications) was speciﬁcally designed and optimised for
execution speed and oﬀers a restricted and controlled set
of applications and services. It is completely under the
control of the issuer. By design, the TED cannot be altered
or modiﬁed once it has been conﬁgured and issued by the
enterprise. Any changes or deviation from expected con-
ﬁguration are remotely detected by the application server
through the TPM integrity measurements and attestation
protocols. Should a change be detected, the issuer can
take appropriate action, such as not engaging in the criti-
cal transaction, or notifying the client that their TED has
been compromised and will be revoked, etc.
Second, data and services are now available (for exam-
ple, when enabled to utilize cloud computing infras-
tructures) to a wider cross-section of users, operating
under unknown and unpredictable computing environ-
ments that lie beyond the control of a single enterprise. In
many cases, the users themselves operate beyond a single
organizational boundary.
These uncertainties are addressed by TED being able
to be plugged into a USB port of any host computer,
without the need for specialised hardware interfaces or
readers, to create a known (to the issuing enterprise),
trusted computing platform and associated environment
and applications that are isolated (from the host’s hard-
ware up through to its operating system and applications)
from the host computer.
The design and implementation of the TED prototype
(both the hardware and software) are presented in detail
in another paper ([11]). We summarise its salient features
here.
An overview of the TED hardware and software
For completeness, the design requirements for the
TED prototype (and its associated software compo-
nents/system) were as follows:
DR-1 Should be small and cheap enough to be portable
and easily re-issued to a client by the owner
enterprise or cloud service provider.
DR-2 Must be able to physically plug into any host PC
with a USB 2.0 compliant port.
DR-3 Must use the USB port solely for power and for
establishing a secure network connection
(tunnel) to well-known servers after it has
successfully booted.
DR-4 Must be able execute owner enterprise or cloud
service provider developed applications on an
embedded operating system.
DR-5 Must include and use a TPM v1.2 compliant
cryptographic microcontroller.
DR-6 Must be able to implement and participate in
attestation and identity management protocols as
per TCG speciﬁcations.
DR-7 Must not require that the host needs to be
rebooted for correct operation.
DR-8 Must not rely on the host PC being interrupted
from normal operation.
DR-9 Must be able to be inserted or removed from the
host PC at any time without causing either the
host or the TED to enter an error state.
The selection of the USB 2.0 connection was based on
pragmatic reasons - USB 2.0 reduced the hardware costs,
complexity and software development time substantially
over other design options.
In principle, a TED may be regarded as a stand-alone
networked device. According to the above design require-
ments, the TED really only requires the host PC for power
and network connectivity (using either wired Ethernet
or WiFi). It operates its own isolated memory address
space, running on a separate CPU, all of which may be
attested as operating within the strictly controlled envi-
ronment provided by the issuing enterprise (which may
be a cloud service provider). There were no requirements
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for having any traditional user screen or keyboards to
interface to it; any such interfaces were to be pro-
vided through appropriately secured connections to the
host PC.
As such, we did consider other designs, including having
a keypad and single LCD screen mounted on the device
that the user may interact with independent of the host
PC (which again was only providing power and secure net-
work connectivity). This design was never implemented
due to time and project resourcing issues. Another design
was a natural development from the “small keypad sin-
gle LCD screen” version, where the TED was connected
to a cellular phone platform providing power and that
utilised 3G data network for secure network connectiv-
ity. However the initial design investigations revealed that
the power requirements of this TED variant exceeded the
capacity of a cellular phone’s supply, and so this optionwas
never pursued.
Figure 1 shows the TED prototype hardware that con-
sisted of two boards: a motherboard containing the CPU,
memory and associated control logic (out of view) and a
daughterboard, carrying the TPM chip, USB interface and
associated power supplies for both boards.
The TED internal software architecture is shown in
Figure 2. It is based on an embedded Linux operat-
ing system, and required the development of dedicated
extensions and drivers to accommodate the TPM device
and USB interface. Above the operating system, the TED
utilised a light-weight TCG Software Stack (TSS) Library
and TSS server that allows applications to interface to the
TPM functions.
A user’s applications execute on the TED (again, that are
under the control of the issuing cloud service provider) to
access external systems. Its execution and memory spaces
are isolated from the host PC, and only uses the host PC
for power and to establish secured Internet connection to
the cloud provider’s service. The secured Internet connec-
tion is tunneled from the TED’s USB port, through the
host PC’s network connections and ﬁnally onto the cloud
provider’s service.
Figure 1 TED engineering prototype.
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Figure 2 TED software architecture.
Integrity measurement and attestation
Without entering into details of the TCG’s recommended
integrity measurement and attestation (of the TED plat-
form and its complete operational environment) [12],
most (except for the Direct Anonymous Attestation pro-
tocols) follow the similar structure of the protocol given
in Figure 3. Section 4.2 in the TCG Speciﬁcation Archi-
tecture Overview [4] gives an excellent overview of this
topic.
At step (1), a challenge message with a fresh nonce is
issued to a platform (in this case, the TED) to attest its
identity and integrity with the application service. Once
this message is received, the TED platform at step (2)
calls a TPM function to generate an Attestation Identity
Key (AIK) and the TPM credentials. These credentials,
along with other credentialsa the public part of the AIK
and the original challenge nonce are signed by the private
TPM Endorsement Key. The resulting signed credential
is then encrypted using the public part of the certify-
ing authority’s key. This is then sent at step (3) to the
certifying authority as a request to validate its creden-
tials. If successful, the certifying authority creates a signed,
encrypted credential that is sent back to the platform at
step (4). Step (5) is used to produce an encrypted sum-
mary of measurements of the environment held in sealed
storage (the Platform Conﬁguration Registers, or PCR)
in the TPM chip. (e.g. one measurement may be a list
of loaded and running processes just after boot, another
measurement may be a new list of running processes
several hours after boot). This encrypted measurement
information is then sent back to the challenger, along
with the identity credential received from the certifying
authority at step (6). Upon reception of the message, the
challenging application service now validates at step (7)
the measured environment and compares it to its own
expected measurements that it holds. During this process,
the challenging application service checks the identity
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Figure 3 An attestation protocol.
credential to determine that it was signed by the certi-
fying authority, as well as verifying the signature of the
measured values and that it contains the original chal-
lenge nonce. Depending on the application requirements,
step (8) may optionally be used to signal to the applica-
tion client the success of the measurement and attestation
process.
Architecture for cloud-based integrity
measurement services using TED
As mentioned previously, we argue that another dimen-
sion of trust in identities on the Internet that must be
accounted for is that of the state or condition of the plat-
form from which a given identity is seeking services. To
this end we propose a cloud-based Integrity Measurement
Service architecture (Figure 4) coupled with TED that adds
the dimension of state measurement to the process of
authentication of clients by the IdP when they seek access
to SPs. In the following we describe the entities, assump-
tions and functions within the architecture, followed by a
description o the steps taken by the User/Client located
within the Enterprise.
Entities, assumptions and functions
Figure 4 shows the entities operating in the ecosystem:
• TED platform, with client and User: The User is
assumed to be an employee within the Enterprise,
using the client software operating on the TED
platform. The TED device is able to perform the
measurement of the client-side environment,
including all application software.
• Enterprise Directory Service (EDS): In the
architecture we assume that some form of directory
services exist under the domain of control of the
Enterprise. For authentication performed by the IdP,
the EDS is assumed to be the authoritative source of
identities for all employees in the enterprise.
Although Figure 4 shows the directory service as
being a separate entity located within a cloud external
to the Enterprise, in practice an implementation can
place the directory service (i) within the Enterprise
(as has been the case in the past), (ii) within a private
cloud inside or outside the physical boundary of the
Enterprise (as is often proposed today), or (iii) within
a hosted service in an external cloud. Regardless of
the conﬁguration of the directory service, in this
architecture we assume that the Enterprise has full
control of the directory, with some degree of sharing
of certain employee attributes and permissions with
the IdP.
• Identity Provider (IdP): The IdP is as understood
broadly in the identity literature, and as deﬁned more
speciﬁcally by the SAML core [13] and SAML proﬁles
[5] speciﬁcations.
When the user performs an SSO to a Service provider
(SP) and is redirected by the SP to the IdP for
authentication, the IdP will perform an additional
step of seeking the measurement of the Client’s
platform. After a successful authentication by the IdP,
Zic and Hardjono Journal of Cloud Computing: Advances, Systems and Applications 2013, 2:4 Page 6 of 9
http://www.journalofcloudcomputing.com/content/2/1/4
Authentication
Service
SAML
Attribute
Provider
S
S
O
S
er
v i
ce
Identity Provider (IdP)
Integrity
Measurement
Server
Clound-based Integrity
Measurement
Service (cIMS)
Client
EnterpriseUser
Enterprise
Directory
Server
Enterprise
Directory
Services
T
E
D
1
2
3
45
6
Cloud Provider
(Service provider (SP))
Enterprise
Application
Figure 4 Overview of the cIMS architecture.
the IdP redirects the Client to the cIMS service (see
below) in order to perform an integrity measurement
using the TCG Trusted Connect Model (TNC) [14].
As a result of a successful authentication and
measurement of the client and TED, the IdP will issue
the relevant signed assertions containing among
others the identity of the client, the LOA level
achieved (according the deﬁned assurance policies set
at the IdP), and the protocol type used to
authenticate the User and Client.
We note that the IdP may take on a similar role of the
TCG’s Privacy Certifying Authority (Privacy CA), of
creating, managing and interacting with the TPM
chip onboard the TED. Although another party could
take on the role of a Privacy CA in principle,
implementing and deploying within a SAML
architecture would present diﬃculties due to policies,
accountability requirements and responsibilities that
come with operating such an authority as a separate
entity.
• Cloud-based Integrity Measurement Service (cIMS):
The cIMS is the service that performs the integrity
measurement and evaluation of the Client platform.
In general, we assume that the IdP has a trust
relationship and a contractual business agreement
with the cIMS based on a mature trust framework.
There are a number of possible outputs from an
evaluation by the cIMS. Here we assume that at the
very least the cIMS returns an integrity score based on
some measurement scale agreed upon with the IdP.
Although the cIMS is shown in Figure 4 as separate
from the IdP, the cIMS could in fact be a service
operating within the IdP. This approach would allow
the IdP to oﬀer a wider set of services while operating
under a single trust framework.
• Cloud Provider (CP): The CP is the cloud provider,
which corresponds to the Service Provider in the
SAML2.0 terminology [5]. The CP is the relying party
who depends entirely on the IdP for correct
authentication and integrity evaluation of the TED
platform. The CP uses the signed SAML assertions
(containing the LOA values) from the IdP in order to
grant/deny access to the User to resources or services
at the CP (either provided by the CP itself or gated by
the CP).
It is important to note that Figure 4 does not explic-
itly show the additional entities and protocols involved
required to fully support the TPM functionality such as
the various key and credential creation and management
functions. Where required, these are presented in the text
of the paper.
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Overview of protocol ﬂows
Figure 4 provides a high level view of the interactions
between the client running on the TED platform with the
IdP. In the following discussion, we use the terminology
and scenario of the SAML2.0 Single Sign-ON (SSO) as
deﬁned in [5]. This well known SSO scenario is purposely
selected in order to highlight the introduction of TED and
the cIMS service.
For clarity, the Privacy Certifying Authority has been
left oﬀ the diagram. As explained in a previous section, the
Privacy CA service could be run by the IdP, or if required,
by a separate trusted third party.
We use the term “Client” to denote the application soft-
ware running on the TED platform that performs the SSO
to the IdP. The Client software is the piece of software
that integrates the authentication client and is entity that
interacts with the SP and IdP on behalf of the user. It
is also the software that triggers the integrity measure-
ments performed by TED, and as such must always be
included in any platform measurements and in integrity
self-checks.
The following summarizes the interaction between the
Client on TED and the entities in the ecosystem:
(1) The Client (on TED) requests access to Cloud
Provider: Following the classic SAML 2.0 SSO
scenario, the Client requests access to resources and
services at the Cloud Provider (which is called the
Service Provider in the SAML2.0 glossary). The CP
redirects the Client to the IdP for authentication of
the Client.
Within the re-directon message the CP includes a
signed integrity schema document (or a pointer to it)
[12]. The integrity schema represents the
components within the client’s platform that is of
interest to the CP. Thus, for example, the CP may be
interested in the status-information regarding the
client’s ﬁrmwares (e.g. BIOS, drivers, etc), in the OS
patch level and in the Anti-Virus (AV) condition of
the client machine.
Note that if the CP and the IdP has a back-channel
established by virtue of their business relationship,
the CP can communicate its set of preferred integrity
schemas to the IdP via the back-channel.
(2) Client Authenticates to IdP : Here the Client has
been redirected by the Cloud Provider (ie. SP) to the
Identity Provider (IdP) for user authentication. The
method for user authentication is out-of scope in this
paper, and has been well treated elsewhere (for
example, see SAML2.0 SSO proﬁle).
After successful authentication by the IdP, the Client
is further re-directed to the cloud-based Integrity
Measurement Service (cIMS) selected by the IdP.
The cIMS is assumed to be a trusted third party
operating under the same trust framework as the IdP
and Cloud provider.
In requesting that an integrity measurement be
performed, the IdP needs to indicate which
components in the client’s environment must be
measured. One possible approach is for the IdP to
include (in its re-direction of the Client) an integrity
schema [12] which indicates to the cIMS which
platform components are of interest to the IdP.
In this way the Client can initiate the TED platform
to perform measurements following the integrity
schema. Later, in compiling the integrity report, TED
will format the report also following the integrity
schema, and return it The integrity schema should be
a core part of the client-proﬁle that the IdP maintains
for that Client.
(3) Client is integrity-evaluated by the cIMS: Here the
Client has been re-directed by the IdP to the cIMS
for the purpose of measurement of the Client and
evaluation by the cIMS.
Upon receiving the indication from the cIMS that an
integrity report is required, the Client performs the
measurement of the components as indicated by the
cIMS. Assuming that an integrity schema was
returned (or pointed to) by the IdP, the TED
performs the measurements following the schema.
The integrity schema provides a uniform and
standard manner in which to indicate which software
components to measure. Examples include the
measurement of the Client itself, other applications,
the kernel, the ﬁrmwares, anti-virus measurements,
and others. Note that a complete measurement of the
entire platform could also be requested [12].
(4) The cIMS forwards a Trust Score to IdP : Upon
completing the evaluation of the integrity report
obtained from TED in the previous step, the cIMS
generates a trust score for the Client. The trust score
reﬂects the judgement of the cIMS (regarding the
Client) as compared against some Integrity
Measurement Policies stored at the cIMS. The cIMS
logs all the measurement and evaluation events, and
archives all received integrity reports and resulting
trust scores in order to maintain audit and
accountability information.
Note that in the multi-host situation, the IdP may
have an account with the cIMS within which it
deﬁnes the set of integrity measurement policies for
all clients that the IdP re-directs to the cIMS. As
such, the cIMS becomes a provider to multiple
IdPs.
(5) The IdP issues assertions with LOA: Upon receiving
the trust score from the cIMS, the IdP compares the
trust score against the access control policies (e.g.
belonging to the Enterprise) stored at the IdP.
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(Alternatively, the IdP could access the relevant
Enterprise access control policies from the EDS).
The IdP then issues a signed assertion or claim
containing the LOA value. The LOA is the result of
the IdP successfully authenticating the User and the
evaluation of the trust score (about the Client/TED)
as received from the cIMS.
Here it is worthwhile noting that the IdP could in fact
issue multiple LOAs, each refering to one aspect of
the authentication event. Thus, for example, an
additional LOA value could also be issued by the IdP
conveying the second factor of authentication used
by the user (e.g. User wielded an OTP token or
biometric device).
(6) The Client sends request to the Cloud Provider:
Upon the signed assertion (containing the LOA
value) from the IdP, the Client forwards the assertion
to the Cloud provider in its re-attempt to access the
resources at the Cloud Provider.
Identity and trustworthy collaborations
Trustworthiness and being able of assure identity claims
with high degree of conﬁdence also arises in broader col-
laborative situations, where organizations have to partner
with each other over a speciﬁc period of time each to
achieve a set of mutually desirable outcomes. Typically,
each participant will have their own respective policies in
place about control and sharing of information, as well
as policies that cover exceptions. When brought together,
the establishment of identity, who has access to informa-
tion and the control of access and the information itself
forces each participant to consider how to evaluate the
trustworthiness of the collaboration and the respective
partners.
We believe that trustworthy collaborations are enabled
if the partners have the following in place:
1. Agreed upon contracts. The collaborating partners
must ﬁrst formalise an agreement (a contract) that
allows them to understand how information within
the collaboration will be used between partners. This
includes who has access, how information may be
shared, how long does the shared information
persist, what happens to shared collaborative
information should a partner leave the collaboration
prematurely or if a new partner joins the
collaboration later, and so on. For cloud service
providers, this typically constitutes an explicit SLA.
2. Demonstrable adherance to the contract Once a
contract between participants is agreed upon, each
partner and their organisations must be able to prove
that they are able to behave according to the
collaborative agreement, and in particular, for those
transactions that are critical within the collaboration.
In this paper, we identify one particular technique
that applies to cloud service providers: the assurance
of the integrity of the systems that are used are within
bounds of the collaboration agreement, as described
in “Background: TED and integrity measurements”.
3. Resolving exceptions and disputes Establishing that
the partners demonstrated compliance against a
contract and behaviour (given in points (1) and (2),
above) also requires the use of a variety of diﬀering
pieces of irrefutable evidence gathered about the
behaviour of each of the collaborators. This evidence
needs to be irrefutable so that it can be used to settle
any disputes about whether or not partners have
behaved according to the collaboration agreement.
From another point of view, each of the partners is
held accountable for their actions. With this in mind,
we developed an Accountability Service, proposed in
[15], that is directly applicable to cloud service
providers. This service may be used to collect and
manage the evidence of critical transactions within a
collaborative environment, where each participant
belongs to a separate organisational domain (with its
own policies).
In terms of the identity claims that are made within a
collaboration, adopting the approach taken in this paper
would be of beneﬁt to each individual participant. Further,
as the cloud service provider is key in establishing and
maintaining the collaborative “infrastructure”, the addi-
tion of services such as accountability and provenance
increases the level of trust in the system and between the
participants by providing (if required) additional evidence
of “good” behaviour as well as irrefutable evidence of “bad”
behaviour.
Conclusion and further work
The goal of this paper is to proposed the use of a cloud-
based integrity management service coupled with a trust-
worthy client component in the form of the portable trust
extension device (TED), as a means to to increase the
quality of the security evaluation of a client. In addi-
tion to performing authentication of the client (e.g. as
part of Single Sign-On), the IdP asks that the integrity of
the client platform be computed and then be evaluated
by a trustworthy and independent Cloud-based Integrity
Measurement Service (cIMS).
The portable TED device performs an integrity mea-
surement of the client platform, and sends an integrity
report to the cIMS the cIMS validates the measurements
performed by the TED device, reports a trust score to
the Identity Provider (IdP). The IdP takes into account the
reported trust score when the IdP computes and issues a
Level of Assurance (LOA) value to the client platform.
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This approach provides a path forward for Service
Providers to obtain better picture of the state of client end-
points, and thereby providing them better assurance of the
quality of the client’s computing environment.
It is our intention to demonstrate a prototype system
in the near future to elaborate upon, and evaluate, the
ideas presented in this paper. Of particular interest to the
authors is using concepts behind this paper in extending
standard authentication systems such as Kerberos to oﬀer
a higher level of assurance of identity claimsmade to cloud
service providers.
Endnote
aThese that are unique to each TPM hardware chip and
“burnt in” during its manufacture.
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